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Asymptotic Network Robustness
T. Sarkar, M. Roozbehani, M. A. Dahleh
Abstract—This paper examines the dependence of perfor-
mance measures on network size with a focus on large net-
works. We develop a framework where it is shown that poor
performance can be attributed to dimension–dependent scaling
of network energy. Drawing from previous work, we show
that such scaling in undirected networks can be attributed
to the proximity of network spectrum to unity, or distance
to instability. However, such a simple characterization does
not exist for the case of directed networks. In fact, we show
that any arbitrary scaling can be achieved for a fixed distance
to instability. The results here demonstrate that it is always
favorable, in terms of performance scaling, to balance a large
network. This justifies a popular observation that undirected
networks generally perform better. We show the relationship
between network energy and performance measures, such as
output shortfall probability or centrality, that are used in
economic or financial networks. The strong connection between
them explains why a network topology behaves qualitatively
similar under different performance measures. Our results
suggest that there is a need to study performance degradation
in large networks that focus on topological dependence and
transcend application specific analyses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks have been successfully used to model many real
world phenomena such as input–output sectoral networks in
economics [1], vehicular platoons in transportation [2] and
opinion dynamics in social sciences [3]. These networks are
characterized by the nature of interconnections, or topology,
and dimension, which is typically very large. Due to the pre-
ponderance of such networks, there is extensive literature on
suitable performance measures and their behavior on different
topologies. However, the idea of a “suitable” performance
measure, as we discuss below, varies across applications. A
major objective of this paper is to understand the underlying
relationship between existing performance measures for large
networks.
There is a substantial body of interdisciplinary research
to find appropriate performance measures for large intercon-
nected networks with stable dynamics and understand the
underlying causes of dimension dependent scaling of these
measures (See [4], [5], [2], [6] and [7] for example). A
commonly used performance measure for design of optimal
controllers is the H2–norm. Specifically, Lin et. al. in [8]
study the design of structured controllers for vehicular pla-
toons with minimum H2–norm. It is observed there that opti-
mal structured controllers with asymmetric feedback exhibit
lower scaling (of H2–norm) with the number of vehicles than
its symmetric counterpart and performs better in that sense.
On the other hand, [5], [6] study the dependence of H2–norm
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on structural properties of the network such as edge weights
and underlying graph spectrum. Huang et. al. study H2–norm
based volatility measures in undirected (symmetric) and sta-
ble network, where the volatility measure can be represented
completely by the network spectrum. The scaling of H2–
norm for different network topologies such as ring, star and
cycle along with the effect of nodal degree perturbation and
the consequent problem of critical edge identification are also
studied there. Another important performance measure for
vehicular platoon networks is the H8–norm. The notion of
harmonic instability, i.e., exponential scaling of H8–norm
in vehicular platoons is studied in [2]. Herman et. al. study
network topologies where a shock on the leader vehicle of a
stable platoon network is magnified exponentially in its size.
Due to this exponential scaling, control of such a network
becomes increasingly problematic as its dimension grows.
Briefly, H2,H8–norms or volatility measures are different
manifestations of energy of a network, which is described in
the future sections.
A seemingly different performance measure than the sys-
tem norms discussed before is studied in [4], [1]. Acemoglu
et. al. introduce a measure called tail risk to assess perfor-
mance in economic production networks. Tail risk measures
the probability of output falling below a certain threshold in
response to an input shock. A key feature of tail risk is that
it can manifest only in networks with large dimension, and
hence captures the idea of performance degradation when
network size increases perfectly. A major conclusion of their
work is that some amount of balancedness is needed in a
large network to exhibit no tail risk.
In control systems theory robust stability, with no structural
constraints on the feedback, is well understood (See [9] for
details). Robust stability entails the study of controllers that
provide internal stability to all networks (or plants) in a
given set. This is particularly useful in the case when there
is some uncertainty about the network, such as unknown
edge weights etc. The notion of “network robustness” that
we discuss here is different from traditional robust stability.
We focus on large networks with stable dynamics where
we study the behavior of performance measures such as the
H2–norm or tail risk. Specifically, we are interested in the
scaling of these measures as a function of network dimension.
We study the underlying causes of this scaling and find
conditions under which it can be attributed to the proximity
of network spectrum to unity. This introduces the idea of
asymptotic instability which is characterized by the spectral
radius approaching unity as network size increases, for a
given topology. We will study the dependence of performance
scaling on asymptotic instability and show when it does
not completely explain such scaling. We will observe that
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excessive scaling in performance measures are closely related
to notions of criticality, centrality and robustness in graphs,
that are well studied in algebraic graph theory. However, there
the graphs considered are “static” (no associated dynamics)
or at equilibrium conditions. Real life networks, on the other
hand, are characterized by their associated topology along
with their complex interconnections and system dynamics.
Therefore, a simultaneous consideration of control and graph
theoretic tools is necessary for the design of robust networks,
where performance measure scales gracefully with network
size.
Although there is a myriad of techniques to assess per-
formance in large networks it is not clear if there exists
some connection between them. For example it is shown
by Acemoglu et. al. that balanced networks exhibit no tail
risk; on the other hand Lin et. al. show that symmetric
networks (a subclass of balanced networks) do not perform
optimally. The dichotomy of these results is surprising since
the underlying dynamics are similar. A major contribution of
this work is that we provide a general framework to analyze
these seemingly disparate results. We also find optimal (in
an appropriate sense) topologies, where performance does
not degrade rapidly as network size increases.
The presentation of the paper is as follows, we introduce
some mathematical notation in Section II. In Section III we
present the mathematical preliminaries required to understand
the paper. We formalize the notion of large networks used
in this paper and describe the network topologies that will
be discussed throughout the paper. We also define network
robustness in large networks here and show its relation to
network energy. Following this, in Section IV we characterize
robustness for undirected (symmetric) networks and prove
that such a characterization does not extend to directed net-
works. Through these observations, we show that undirected
topologies exhibit the best performance for a fixed spectral
radius. We establish connections between network robustness
and different performance measures used in economics, trans-
portation and finance in Section V. The main results of the
paper can be found in Sections IV, V. Finally, we conclude
in Section VI. All proofs are in the appendix.
II. MATHEMATICAL NOTATION
Matrix Theory: A vector v P Rnˆ1 is of the form
rv1, . . . , vnsT , where vi denotes the ith element, unless speci-
fied otherwise. The vector 1 is the all 1s vector of appropriate
dimension; to specify the dimension we sometimes refer
to it as 1n, where it is a n ˆ 1 vector. Similarly, for a
m ˆ n matrix, A, we refer to it as Amˆn when we want
to specify dimension. We denote A that is a n ˆ n matrix
as An for short hand. For a matrix, A, we denote by ρpAq
its spectral radius. Additionally, we have ρipAq ě ρi`1pAq
where ρipAq “ |λipAq| the ith–eigenvalue of A. Thus,
ρ1pAq “ ρpAq. We have a similar notation for the singular
values of A denoted by σipAq. I is the identity matrix of
appropriate dimension.
The Lp norm of a matrix, A, is given by
||A||p “ sup
v
||Av||p{||v||p
||A||S is the Schatten norm, i.e., ||A||S “ řni“1 σipAq. For
positive semidefinite (psd) matrices the Schatten norm equals
the trace of the matrix. The symbol ľ denotes the Loewner
order between two Hermitian matrices A,B, i.e., if A ľ B
or A ľPSD B then A´B is a psd matrix, similarly if A ĺ B
or A ĺPSD B then B ´A is a psd matrix.
Order Notation: For functions, fp¨q, gp¨q, we have fpnq “
Opgpnqq, when there exist constants C, n0 such that fpnq ď
Cgpnq for all n P N ą n0. Further, if fpnq “ Opgpnqq,
then gpnq “ Ωpfpnqq. For functions gp¨q, hp¨q, we have
gpnq “ Θphpnqq when there exist constants C1, C2, n1 such
that C1hpnq ď gpnq ď C2hpnq for all n P N ą n1. Finally,
for functions h1p¨q, h2p¨q, we have h1pnq “ oph2pnqq when
limnÑ8 |h1pnq{h2pnq| “ 0.
Graph Theory: A graph is the tuple G “ pVG , EG , wGq,
where VG “ tv1, v2, . . . , vnu represents the set of nodes and
EG Ď VG ˆVG represents the set of edges or communication
links. An edge or link from node i to node j is denoted
by eri, js “ pvi, vjq P EG , and wG : EG Ñ R. Denote by
AG the adjacency matrix of G. A graph, G, is symmetric
or undirected if wGpvi, vjq “ wGpvi, vjq for all 1 ď i, j ď
|VG |. G is induced by a matrix, Anˆn if VG “ t1, . . . , nu,
and pi, jq P EG if rAsij ‰ 0, and wGpi, jq “ rAsij . The
adjacency matrix of a graph G is denoted by A. A is a |VG |ˆ
|VG | matrix with the following property: rAsij “ 1 if there
is an edge iÑ j else it is 0.
Probability Theory: For a random variable X , we define
µpXq “ ErXs
σpXq “ ErpX ´ µpXqq2s1{2
Φp¨q is the cumulative distribution function of Gaussian
distribution and is given by
Φpxq “ 1?
2pi
ż x
´8
e´t
2{2dt
We sometimes refer to the probability density function and
cumulative distribution function of a random variable as pdf
and cdf respectively. For a random variable X , the τ–tail
probability is given by
P
˜
|X ´ µpXq|
σpXq ą τ
¸
Miscellaneous: Denote by Pd is the family of polynomials
with degree ď d P N.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Definition 1. A network is a graph G “ pVG , EG , wGq,
where VG “ t1, 2, . . . , nu, and for each node, i P VG , there
is an associated dynamical behavior, i Ñ xip¨q. Further,
wGpi, jq “ rAsij for all 1 ď i, j ď n.
In this work, we will focus on networks with linear
dynamics given by Eq. (1) described below
xpk ` 1q “ A xpkq ` ω δp0, kq, k P t0, 1, 2, . . .u (1)
Here xpkq “ rx1pkq, . . . , xnpkqsT is the vector of state
variables. A is the n ˆ n state transition matrix. δp0, kq
is the Kronecker delta function, with δp0, 0q “ 1 and
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δp0, kq “ 0 @ k ‰ 0 and ω “ rω1, . . . , ωnsT is exogenous to
the system. We further assume that xp0q “ 0. Additionally,
we have the following assumptions
Assumption 1. The dynamical behavior of the network is
governed by Eq. (1). Further, the state transition matrix A
is Schur stable, i.e., ρpAq ă 1.
Assumption 1 is an assumption on the network dynamics
and its stability that will be enforced on all networks in this
work, unless otherwise stated. We will call 1´ ρpAq as the
distance to instability of A.
Definition 2. A network is undirected if A is symmetric,
otherwise it is a directed network.
Definition 3. A signal, wpkq, is a shock if wpkq “ 0 for all
k ą 0 but wp0q ‰ 0.
Then wpkq “ ωδp0, kq is a shock.
Remark 1. Every network, in this paper, can be uniquely
characterized by its state transition matrix, or network ma-
trix, A.
xn2
xn1 xn4
xn5
xnnxn3
!n2
!n1 !n4
!n5
!nn
!n3 k = 0
Fig. 1: Network with noise on every node, k “ 0
The key feature of our work is that we address large net-
works. We denote a large network by “a sequence of networks
with network matrices tAnu8n“1, where the topology of each
network in the sequence is fixed but network dimension
grows successively”. This treatment is along the lines of
graph limits as discussed in [10]. For example, to denote
a large star network we define a sequence of star networks
tAnu8n“1 with dimensions n ˆ n “ 1 ˆ 1, 2 ˆ 2, 3 ˆ 3, . . ..
In this example we have
An “
»———–
0 1n´1
1
n´1 . . .
1
n´1
1 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 0
fiffiffiffifl
From here on, whenever we use “sequence of networks” we
will mean a “large” network.
A mathematical quantity that will play an important role
in the discussion of performance scaling is the (identity)
Gramian that we define below(See [11] for a detailed ex-
position).
Definition 4. The (identity) gramian of a Schur stable matrix,
A, is given by P pAq, or, P , where P “ ATPA` I .
Throughout this paper we consider some commonly en-
countered networks. We summarize them below.
Networks with degree normalization
These networks are of the form An “ γD´1n An where Dn
is the degree matrix, An is the adjacency matrix of An and
0 ă γ ă 1. Edges with arrow are directed edges. We will
Regular Star 
Cycle Directed Line 
Fig. 2: Different Network Topologies
refer to the regular, star, cycle, directed line degree networks
as Rn, Sn, Cn, DLn respectively.
Rn “ γ
n´ 1 p11
T ´ Iq
rDLnsi,j “
#
1 if j “ i` 1
0 otherwise
rSnsi,j “
$’&’%
γ if i ‰ j and j “ 1
γ
n´1 if i ‰ j and i “ 1
0 otherwise
rCnsi,j “
$’’’&’’’%
γ{2 if i “ j ` 1
γ{2 if j “ i` 1
γ{2 if pi, jq “ p1, nq or pi, jq “ pn, 1q
0 otherwise
Network with loops
The topology in Fig. 3 appears frequently in transportation
Fig. 3: Network VPn
networks as vehicular platoons. The values of λi, i are
chosen to ensure Schur stability of the network.
rVPnsi,j “
$’&’%
λi if i “ j
i if j “ i` 1
0 otherwise
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Random Networks
Our results can be extended to random discrete time LTI
systems. We consider the Wigner ensemble defined as
follows
Definition 5. A Wigner matrix, Wnpσq, is a matrix that has
the following properties:
‚ For all 1 ď i ă j ď n, Wnpσqij is i.i.d. and Wnpσqij „
N p0, σ2q.
‚ rWnpσqsij “ rWnpσqsji
‚ trWnpσqsiiuni“1 are i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance σ2.
For all l ‰ j, rWnpσqsii is independent of rWnpσqslj .
A Wigner ensemble is a discrete time LTI system where An “
Wnpσq?
n
where σ ă 12 .
The performance measures we are concerned with are
closely related to the “network energy” that we describe
below
Definition 6. The H2–norm of a network A is given by
H2pAq “ tracepP pAqq
H2–norm is a common system norm that will occur
frequently in our discussion to measure performance of a
network. In fact, H2–norm measures the cumulative amplifi-
cation of a shock due to network effects, i.e., network energy.
Here we present an interpretation of network energy. At time
k “ 0, each node i is hit with a shock, ωi, then we are
interested in the following questions -
‚ If ω “ rω1, . . . , ωnsT is a deterministic shock, with
||ω||2 ď 1, then what is maximum effect of the shock
on the network ?
‚ If ω is a random shock, then what is the effect of the
shock on the network, on average ?
We measure the energy of the network by the quantity,
E8 “ ř8k“0 xT pkqxpkq, and without loss of generality we
will assume xp0q “ 0.
Definition 7. Given a network, A, with a deterministic input
shock, ω, max norm, MpAq, is given by:
MpAq “ sup
||ω||2“1
E8 (2)
We will refer to MpAq as the maximum disruption energy of
A.
Definition 8. Given a network, A, with a a random shock, ω,
average norm (per node), EpAq, is defined as the following:
EpAq “ p1{nqEωrE8s (3)
Here Erωs “ 0,ErωωT s “ I . We will refer to EpAq as the
average disruption energy of A.
Proposition 1. The max norm, MpAq, is σ1pP pAqq, and the
average norm, EpAq, is p1{nqH2pAq.
MpAq and EpAq represent two different aspects of net-
work robustness. When there is a deterministic shock incident
to the network, MpAq denotes the maximum energy that
can propagate through the network. On the other hand if it
is a random shock, then EpAq denotes expected energy that
propagates through the network (due to each node). However,
MpAq, EpAq are closely related through the Gramian P pAq:
which itself gives a complete energy profile for a network.
Whenever ρpAq ě 1 it is well known that network energy
increases in an unbounded fashion(See [11]). To simply
observe the effect of interconnections on network energy, by
factoring out the distance to instability i.e. 1 ´ ρpAq, we
propose the scaled H2–norm.
Definition 9. The scaled H2–norm of a network A, denoted
by HS2 pAq, is
HS2 pAq “ p1´ ρpAqqtracepP pAqq
Using the H2–norm as a performance measure (or robust-
ness measure) we formalize the notion of “graceful scaling”.
Definition 10. A large network, An, is robust (in an asymp-
totic sense) if we have:
‚ Network matrix, An, is stable for each n
‚ H2pAnq “ Opppnqq
Here pp¨q P Pd for some d P N. Fragility is the lack of
robustness in the sense of super-polynomial or exponential
scaling of tracepP pAnqq for tAnu. Further, let A1, A2 be two
networks and H2pA1nq “ Θpp1pnqq,H2pA2nq “ Θpp2pnqq.
Then
‚ If p1pnq “ opp2pnqq then A1n performs better than A2n
in H2–norm.
‚ If p1pnq “ Θpp2pnqq then A1n performs as well as A2n.
‚ If p2pnq “ opp1pnqq then A1n performs worse than A2n.
Definition 11 (Spectral Balancing). Given a large network,
An, and any 0 ă  ă 1, we define its –balanced version as
An “ p1´ qAn ` UnΓnUTn
where ρpAnq “ γ ă 1, Γn is a diagonal matrix with ρpΓnq ď
γ and spectral decomposition of P pAnq given by P pAnq “
UnDnU
T
n .
Remark 2. It is easy to observe that for an –balanced
version we have that
maxpaji, aijq´minpaji, aijq ď maxpaji, aijq´minpaji, aijq
for every pair i, j. Balancing makes a network more undi-
rected.
Spectral balancing will be useful in understanding what
network topologies perform better and will be discussed in
the future sections.
IV. ROBUSTNESS IN LARGE NETWORKS
We analyze network energy of an undirected network and
show that it is completely characterized by its spectral radius.
Proposition 2. For a large undirected network, An, we have
MpAnq “ 1
1´ ρ2pAnq
EpAnq “ Op1{p1´ ρpAnqqq
Proposition 2 is an extension of Proposition 1 in [6].
According to this, the scaling in the “network volatility” or
H2–norm of a large network is limited by the proximity of
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its spectral radius to unity. For completeness we present the
H2–norm of the networks introduced before.
Proposition 3. For the topologies in Fig. 2
Network Mp¨q Ep¨q
Sn Θpnq Θp1q
Rn, Cn Θp1q Θp1q
DLn Θpnq Θpnq
Wigner Ensemble Θp1q Θp1q
The result for Wigner ensemble is true with probability 1.
The proof of this proposition and numerical verification
can be found in Section VII-C. It turns out that the maximum
disruption in Sn is more than in Rn. This happens because
one unit of energy given to the central node is transferred to
every other node at the next time instant (an amplification
of n ´ 1). On the other hand in Rn only 1{pn ´ 1q energy
is transferred to every other node. However, both have the
similar disruption on average because the probability of
picking the central node is 1{n (assume uniform) and as a
result
EpSnq « p1{nqpn´ 1q `
nÿ
j“2
p1{nq “ Θp1q
Another surprising observation is the high network energy
for DLn despite the spectral radius being zero. One possible
explanation is the unidirectional nature of the network where
energy is transferred from one node to the other as is. The
natural question to ask is if there exists a characterization
of network energy based on spectral radius for directed
networks.
Proposition 4. For the large network VPn(in Fig. 3) with
i “ 1 and δ1 ă λi ă δ2 for all i and some 0 ă δ1, δ2 ă 1,
we have that the H2pVPnq is Ωpexp pcnqq and ρpVPnq ď δ2.
Based on Proposition 4, we see that poor scaling of per-
formance measures, in general networks, cannot be attributed
to their spectra. In fact, under certain conditions they might
turn out to be independent.
In the next section we discuss the applications of ideas
developed here. We present a well studied model of a platoon
network. We show that balancing cannot increase network
energy – which gives us a direction to improve performance
in networks. Second, we present the case of an economic
network. Although the performance measure seems quite
different to network energy they are closely related by the
Gramian.
V. CONNECTIONS TO PERFORMANCE MEASURES
A. Robustness as Network Energy
We revisit the discussion of H2–norm scaling in different
networks (directed and undirected) from the previous section.
We observe that, whenever possible, making a network more
undirected always results in better performance scaling.
Theorem 1. For any large network An with ρpAnq “ γ we
have that
EpAnq “ OpEpAnqq,MpAnq “ OpMpAnqq
Here An is –balanced version of An for any fixed 0 ă  ă 1.
The implications of Theorem 1 are multifold. It guarantees
that spectral balancing does not increase energy in an order
sense. The intuition behind balancing, i.e., making the net-
work “more symmetric”, follows from Proposition 2 where
we show that symmetric networks have the best possible
scaling of network energy in network dimension. Indeed there
are examples where an asymmetric controller is the most
optimal (See Lin et. al. [8]) and balancing does not strictly
reduce energy. However, designing such a controller is very
challenging. Instead, Theorem 1 suggests that searching over
balancing operations provides an easier alternative that may
reduce network energy. In fact in Fig. 5 we show that in many
cases spectral balancing strictly reduces network energy.
Scaling in Network Controllers
Here we present more concrete examples from transporta-
tion networks to show how robustness scaling manifests in
controllers for vehicular platoons. We consider the vehicular
platoon network discussed in [8]. The closed loop dynamical
system (Eqns.(SS) and (VP2) in [8]) is of the form (dis-
cretized single integrator version)
xpk ` 1q ´ xpkq “ ´Kxpkq ` dpkq (4)
xipk ` 1q ´ xipkq “ ki,i´1pxi´1pkq ´ xipkqq
` ki,i`1pxi`1pkq ´ xipkqq
where xipkq is the relative position error for vehicle i. Here
K is of the form
K “
»————–
k1,1 ` k1,2 ´k1,2
´k2,1 k2,1 ` k2,3 . . .
. . . . . . ´kn´1,n
´kn,n´1 kn,n ` kn,n´1
fiffiffiffiffifl
Assume first that K is symmetric, i.e.,
K “
»————–
k1 ` k2 ´k2
´k2 k2 ` k3 . . .
. . . . . . ´kn´1
´kn´1 kn ` kn´1
fiffiffiffiffifl
Additionally, ρpI´Kq ă 1 for stability. The structure of the
feedback is given in Fig. 4. xi denotes the position of vehicle
i.
x2 x3 xnx1
k2 (x1 − x2 )
−k2 (x1 − x2 )
k3(x2 − x3)
−k3(x2 − x3)
Fig. 4: Feedback structure for symmetric platoon
Now, the optimal symmetric controller design is given by
Ksym “ arg minimizeK tracepP q
where pI ´KqP pI ´Kq ` I “ P (5)
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Proposition 5. For the optimal symmetric controller in
Eq. (4) we have
H2pI ´Ksymq “ Ωpn2q
Although the number of nodes in the network are n, we
observe that even the optimal controller gives a Ωpnq per ve-
hicle scaling in the robustness measure. Such a performance
degradation might be harmful when strict control is required.
Next, we consider an asymmetric controller studied in [2]
given by K (0 ď i ď 1)
K “
»————–
k1 ` k22 ´k22
´k2 k2 ` k33 . . .
. . . . . . ´knn
´kn kn ` kn`1n`1
fiffiffiffiffifl
The solving for the optimal controller
Kasm “ arg minimizeK,0ďiď1 tracepP q
where pI ´ pKqT qP pI ´Kq ` I “ P (6)
Observe when i “ 1 for all i we have K “ Ksym, i.e., the
symmetric controller discussed before. On the other extreme
is when i “ 0 for all i for which K is a purely asymmetric
controller. Then for the optimal asymmetric controller prob-
lem we have that
Proposition 6. For the optimal asymmetric controller in
Eq. (6) we have
H2pI ´Kasmq “ Opn3{2q
Propositions 5,6 show that the network energy of the
optimal symmetric controller is higher than the asymmetric
one. The underlying cause of this is distance to instability
p1´ρpI´Kθqq where θ P tasm, symu. To that end, we look
at the scaled H2–norm of the controller. For symmetric case,
by using Proposition 2, we have that
HS2 pI ´Ksymq “ Op1q (7)
On the other hand for Kasm we have
HS2 pI ´Kasmq “ Θpn3{2q (8)
Eq. (7) suggests that I´Ksym is asymptotically unstable, i.e.,
ρpI ´Ksymq Ñ 1, nÑ8
This also means that if we suppress the effect of distance to
instability then there is no growth in network energy (as its
size increases). One can conclude that the key to making an
undirected network more robust is by increasing the distance
to instability. A similar argument does not extend to directed
networks. Indeed as discussed before, even if distance to
instability is large a network may exhibit arbitrary scaling.
Then to make such a network more robust we use Theorem 1.
We show how balancing affects network energy in Fig. 5.
For this case we generate networks, An, such that rAnsij „
N p0, 1q are i.i.d. We scale them so that every network
has spectral radius γ ă 1(See [12] for details). Γn, as in
Definition 11, is generated in a random fashion such that
ρpΓnq ď γ. Then as we vary  it is observed that H2–norm
reduces as  increases. The effect of balancing the asymmetric
controller is shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 5: H2–norm variation with different –balancing
B. Robustness as a Tail Risk Measure
In many applications it is important to understand how
far network output deviates from its mean in response to a
random shock. Such a “worst” case analysis is important in
areas such as economics where one is interested in knowing
how far the output of a factory, for example, may fall below
optimum in response to an input shock. Although both tail
risk and expected energy, Ep¨q–norm, depend on certain
network topological properties, the exact relation between
them is unclear. In this section we make the connection that
scaling in both expected energy and tail probability of output
depend solely on the underlying network Gramian.
In Eq. (1) assume that the shock ω „ N p0, Iq, i.e., ωi „
N p0, 1q and tωiuni“1 are independent. Define the aggregate
output x8 as
x8 “
8ÿ
k“0
1Txpkq (9)
with xp0q “ 0 (for simplicity). In general, xp0q is the
predefined output, and the model here captures the deviation
from this value in response to a shock. Then it is easy
to check that x8 is a linear combination of independent
standard normal random variables and thus a Gaussian ran-
dom variable(See [13]). We are interested in studying the
distribution of aggregate output, x8.
The assumption that ωi „ N p0, 1q is merely illustrative. Our
results hold for a general class of distributions that we define
below:
Definition 12. A random variable X has exponential tails if
‚ ErXs “ µ
‚ ErpX ´ µq2s “ σ2
‚ Erexp pbXqs ă 8, for some b ą 0
We denote its distribution by X „ Epµ, σq.
For the remainder of this section, we will impose the
following distributional assumption on ω
Assumption 2. The shock, tωi „ Ep0, 1quni“1, has continu-
ous, symmetric probability density function with full support.
Further, tωiuni“1 are independent.
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Example of Epµ, σq is the standard normal where µ “
0, σ “ 1.
We focus on “worst case” analysis of aggregate output
and will be interested in its tail probability behavior. From
this perspective, Epµ, σq is a richer class compared to the
family of Gaussian distributions. At the same time, these
distributions exhibit favorable tail behavior (such as the Large
Deviation Principle [14] etc.) that make them amenable to
such analysis. We impose additional assumptions on the class
of networks we consider in this section,
Assumption 3. Network matrix An has the following prop-
erties
‚ rAnsij ě 0.
‚ There exists v such that
Anv “ λPF v
where vmax{vmin “ Op1q and λPF is the Perron root.
Examples of such networks include networks with degree
normalization introduced in Section III. These fall under the
more general class of networks where An “ γWn (0 ă γ ă
1) and Wn is row–stochastic. Note that this assumption is
weaker than those required for irreducibility or aperiodicity.
For example the star network, Sn, is neither aperiodic nor
irreducible, however vmax “ vmin (as v “ 1) in that case.
We can now define tail risk in a network as follows
Definition 13 (Tail Risk). For x8 in response to tωi „
Ep0, 1quni“1, define
Rnpzq “ ´p1{nq log pPp|x8| ą nzqq
Then An exhibits no tail risk if there exists z ą 0 such that
limnÑ8Rnpzq ą 0.
Rnp¨q is a measure of how likely it is for the average
aggregate output to fall below a certain threshold ´z in
response to a shock. In this context, a robust large network
is resistant to random shocks, i.e., output is not affected too
much.
Example 1. Consider the special case when An “ µInˆn.
A simple computation shows us that
x8 “
řn
i“1 ωi
1´ µ
Then by Cramer’s theorem we have that limnÑ8Rnpzq ą 0.
Next, when An “ µr1, 1, . . . , 1sT r1, 0, . . . , 0s, i.e.,
xipk ` 1q “ µx1pkq
then
x8 “ pn´ 1qµ` 1
1´ µ ω1 `
nÿ
i“2
ωi
and then it is easy to show that
lim
nÑ8Rnpzq “ 0
This follows because
Pp|x8| ą nzq ě P
´ pn´ 1qµ` 1
1´ µ ω1 ą nz,
nÿ
i“2
ωi ě 0
¯
“ P
´ pn´ 1qµ` 1
1´ µ ω1 ą nz
¯
P
´řn
i“2 ωi?
n´ 1 ě 0
¯
lim
nÑ8Pp|x8| ą nzq “
1
2
P
´ µ
1´ µω1 ą z
¯
ą 0
In the first case, the shock is averaged out across the nodes:
and the network exhibits no risk. In the second case output
of each node, xi, is heavily dependent on the other: and
network exhibits tail risk.
In large networks, a fast decay of “failure” or “shortfall”
probability with network dimension is ideal. Rnp¨q captures
this notion of risk in networks – the more dependent indi-
vidual components become, more likely the failure. Another
interpretation that follows from Definition 13 is that when-
ever we have
x8?
n
„ N p0, σ20q
for some σ0 “ Op1q, the network does not exhibit tail risk.
We will show in Theorem 3 that the converse is true as
well. For example, the tail of x8{?n obtained from the star
network Sn becomes wider as n increases and it will be
shown in Proposition 7 that star networks exhibit tail risk(See
Fig. 6). The reason behind this is that σpx8q Ñ 8 as nÑ8
Fig. 6: pdf of x8{?n as n increases for regular and star
networks
for Sn. This notion of comparison to Gaussian tail probability
was introduced by Acemoglu et. al.(See [1], [4]) to measure
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disruption in economic production networks. To formalize
this first we define “tail risk relative to standard normal” for
random variables as this will give us some understanding of
the behavior we intend to capture.
Definition 14. Random variable X exhibits tail risk relative
to standard normal distribution if limτÑ8 rXpτq “ 0 where
rXpτq “ log pPpZX ă ´τqq
log pΦp´τqq
where
ZX “ X ´ µpXq
σpXq
Definition 14 implies that whenever τ–tail probability (for
very large τ ) of X substantially exceeds that of Gaussian
random variable, X exhibits tail risk relative to standard
normal. rXpτq can, in general, be hard to visualize. A thumb
rule for any X „ Ep0, 1q and large enough τ ą 0 is to
inspect the tails of the pdf of X . This follows from: item 3 in
Definition 12, finiteness of moment generating function(See
Chernoff’s bound Theorem 2.29 Chapter 2 [?]), and the
approximation, for every x ą τ , that is shown below
PpZX ă ´xq « e´Ωpxq «
ż ´x
´8
fXpzqdz « fXp´xq
Here fXpzq is the pdf of X at z. Figure 7 shows a pair
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
x
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
pd
f(x
)
Normal
Logistic
Fatter Tails
Fig. 7: pdf of Logistic (red) vs Normal tails (blue); Logistic
distribution has fatter tails and exhibits tail risk relative to
standard normal
of distributions in the family Ep0, 1q: Gaussian and logistic
distribution. The pdf of logistic distribution, fLpxq, is given
by
fLpxq “ e
´x
p1` e´xq2
Logistic distribution exhibits tail risk relative to standard
normal distribution due to “fatter tails”. Now, we extend
the previous definition to the context of networks by setting
τ “ ?n. This captures size dependent scaling and follows
the definition of macroeconomic tail risk in [1], [4].
Definition 15 (Macroeconomic Tail Risk). The network,
An, exhibits tail risk relative to the standard normal (or
macroeconomic tail risk) if limnÑ8Rx8p
?
nq “ 0 where
Rx8pτq “ log pPpZx8 ă ´τqqlog pΦp´τqq
where
Zx8 “ x8 ´ µpx8qσpx8q
Tail risk differs from macroeconomic tail risk in the sense
that macroeconomic tail risk (after normalization by its mean
and variance) is measured relative to the standard normal
distribution. Both notions of risk are applied extensively in
economic networks and financial systems and as a result,
it becomes important to understand how they relate to each
other.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 2,3, An exhibits no tail risk
if and only if
||P pAn{
a
λPF q||1 “ Θp1q
where λPF is its Perron root.
We showed that a lack of tail risk is equivalent to constant
scaling in L1–norm of an appropriate system Gramian. In the
following discussion we show that tail risk coincides with
macroeconomic tail risk and its application to a real network
setting.
Tail Risk in Input Output Networks
In this section we discuss applications of our results to
the 2007 U.S. Commodity market. The data for this has
been taken from [1]. It consists of a network with 379
sectors where commodity generated by each sector is either
utilized by itself or fed as input to another sector. These
interconnections generate a network matrix, A379. Some
properties of this network are
‚ rA379sij ě 0
‚ ρpA379q » 0.51
‚ A379 (almost) satisfies Assumption 3.
Now it can be shown that
yt`1 “ A379yt ` ωt (10)
Here yt is output deficit at time t in response to an input
shock ωt. Details of the economic model is given in Section
II, III up to Eq. 25 in [19], Section I, VII in [1]. This is
summarized briefly in Section VII-L. Then x8 “ ř8t“0 1T yt
Fig. 8: pdf of x8{?n for the US Commodity network vs.
standard normal; US Commodity network exhibits tail risk
as pdf tails of x8{?n are fatter than std. normal
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is the aggregate deficit. The aggregate deficit is useful in
estimating business cycles and computing gross domestic
product, or GDP (See Proof of Proposition 1 [1]). We observe
that the tails of aggregate output deficit are indeed fatter
compared to the standard normal distribution. The question
is how this observation can be related to Theorem 2. In the
next theorem we demonstrate that, under mild conditions, a
network exhibits tail risk whenever x8 has fatter tails.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 2,3, An exhibits no macroe-
conomic tail risk if and only if it exhibits no tail risk.
Theorem 3 suggests that the U.S. Commodity market
network exhibits tail risk and this observation is corroborated
through Fig. 1 of [1]. Finally, through Theorems 2,3 we
show that different notions of risk can be represented as
robustness measures, i.e., manifestation of tail risk in a
network is equivalent to poor scaling of some Gramian norm.
We conclude with some examples of network topologies and
comment on their robustness (to tail risk).
Proposition 7. The regular network, Rn, and cycle network,
Cn, exhibits no macroeconomic tail risk. On the other hand,
star network, Sn, exhibits macroeconomic tail risk.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the star network which
has a high degree centrality (See [15]) demonstrates tail risk.
A generalization of degree centrality is eigenvector centrality.
Definition 16. An irreducible network matrix, An, demon-
strates no eigenvector centrality if
pimax{pimin “ Θp1q
where piTAn “ piT .
Corollary 1. If an irreducible network matrix, An, has no
eigenvector centrality then it exhibits no tail risk.
It is not hard to verify that Sn has a central node and
Rn, Cn exhibit no centrality. In addition to showing that tail
risk is closely related to network energy, we also relaxed
some of the assumption on network structure imposed by
Acemoglu et. al. in [1]. Our analysis can be extended to
the case when we have increasing returns to scale, i.e.,řn
j“1 aij ą 1 for example.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work developed a general framework to study per-
formance degradation in large networks. It is shown that
dimension–dependent scaling of network energy is closely
related to such degradation. The results here provide an
analytical characterization of network energy scaling for an
undirected network in terms of its distance to instability. It
is shown that, for a fixed distance to instability, H2–norm
scales at most linearly in the size of network. On the contrary,
results here suggest that for directed networks distance to
instability and H2–norm scaling may be completely unre-
lated. The observation that undirected networks exhibit a
certain optimality in energy scaling could be used as a design
principle to obtain more graceful performance. Under this
general framework, notions of centrality and tail risk that
appear more commonly in areas such as economics, finance
etc. are related to network energy. This is a step towards
more interdisciplinary research in design of robust network
controllers.
The work here is confined to networks with linear stable
dynamics. Further extensions to marginally stable dynamics,
such as those in consensus networks, will be discussed in a
future work.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the case when ω is deterministic with ||ω||2 ď 1,
then we
8ÿ
t“0
xptqTxptq “ ωT
8ÿ
t“0
pAT qtAtω
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sup
||ω||2ď1
8ÿ
t“0
xptqTxptq “ sup
||ω||2ď1
ωT
8ÿ
t“0
pAT qtAtω
“ sup
||ω||2ď1
ωTP pAqω
MpAq “ σ1pP q
For the case when Erωs “ 0,ErωωT s “ I we have that
Er
8ÿ
t“0
xptqTxptqs “ ErωT
8ÿ
t“0
pAT qtAtωs
“ Ertracep
8ÿ
t“0
AtωωT pAT qtqs
“ tracep
8ÿ
t“0
AtpAT qtq
EpAq “ p1{nqtracepP pAqq “ p1{nqH2pAq
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Since A is symmetric, we have that P pAq “ řt“0A2t.
Now ||A2t||2 “ ρpAq2t and since the eigen vectors of A2t
identical to A2t`2 we have
σ1pP pAqq “ 1
1´ ρ2pAq ď
1
1´ ρpAq
The assertion follows because MpAq ě EpAq.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
For brevity, we prove here the scaling of the networks we
introduced in Section III.
Star Network pSnq:
Sn “ γ
»———–
0 1n´1
1
n´1 . . .
1
n´1
1 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 0
fiffiffiffifl
We can verify that
S2k`1n “ γ2k`1
»———–
0 1n´1
1
n´1 . . .
1
n´1
1 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 0
fiffiffiffifl
and
S2kn “ γ2k
»———–
1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1n´1
1
n´1 . . .
1
n´1
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 1n´1
1
n´1 . . .
1
n´1
fiffiffiffifl
Since P pSnq ľPSD ř8k“0pSTn q2k`1S2k`1n we have that||P pSnq||2 ě γp1´ γ2q´1||Sn||22. But
P pSnq “ I `
8ÿ
k“0
γ2kpS2nqTS2n `
8ÿ
j“0
γ2j`1pSnqTSn
thus, ||P pSnq||2 ď 1 ` p1 ´ γ2q´1p||Sn||22 ` ||S2n||22q which
follows from the subadditivity of L2–norm. Further, since
||STn Sn||max ď ||STn Sn||2 ď ||STn Sn||S
we have that ||Sn||22 “ Θpnq and since S2n is symmetric we
have ||S2n||22 “ Θp1q, then our claim follows. By a similar
argument, ||P pSnq||S “ Θpnq.
Regular Network pRnq:
Rn “ γ
»———–
0 1n´1 . . .
1
n´1
1
n´1 0 . . .
1
n´1
...
...
. . .
...
1
n´1
1
n´1 . . . 0
fiffiffiffifl
Since Rn is symmetric then ||P pRnq||2 “ p1{p1 ´
ρ2pRnqqq´1 and ρpRnq “ γ (By Perron-Frobenius Theorem)
and from Proposition 2 we have ||P pRnq||2 “ Θp1q and due
to the symmetry of topology we have tracepP pRnqq “ Θpnq.
Directed Line pDLnq:
DLn “
»———–
0 0 . . . 0
1 0 . . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 . . . 1 0
fiffiffiffifl
DLn is nilpotent, i.e., DLnn “ 0nˆn. One can check that
pDLknqTDLkn “ Diagp1, 1, . . .loomoon
n-k
, 0, 0, . . .loomoon
k
q, where Diagpvq is
the matrix with diagonal elements as v. Then we have
that ||P pDLnq||2 “ ||ř8k“0pDLknqTDLkn||2 “ ||∆n||2 “
Θpnq, ||P pDLnq||S “ Θpn2q where
∆n “
»———–
n 0 . . . 0
0 n´ 1 . . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 . . . 0 1
fiffiffiffifl
Cycle Network pCnq: The proof is similar to that of Rn (a
combination of Proposition 2 and symmetric topology).
Wigner Ensemble: The proof of this follows from Theorem
A in [16]. There it is shown that for Wigner matrices (actually
a much larger class of symmetric matrices) we have that
ρpAq “ 2σ ă 1 almost surely as nÑ8 i.e. large networks.
As a result in our case, using Proposition 2, we have that
MpAq, EpAq “ O
´ 1
1´ 2σ
¯
This result is again corroborated by Theorem 1 in [17] (but
convergence is shown in expectation only). From Eq. 10 in
the same reference and picking k “ 1, we see that
1
n
trace
´
EtP u
¯
“
8ÿ
j“0
σ2j
1
j ` 1
ˆ
2j
j
˙
EpAq ă 1`
8ÿ
j“1
p2σq2j
?
2e
2pi
?
jpj ` 1q
ă C
1´ 2σ
for some absolute constant C. We also verify this numerically
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Fig. 9: Mp¨q growth of networks with size
D. Proof of Proposition 4
J “
»———–
λ1 1 0 . . . 0
0 λ2 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . λn
fiffiffiffifl
Notice that since λi ą 0, we have that ||Jd||8 ě ||Jpλqd||8
for any 0 ď λ ď mini λi, where
Jpλq “
»———–
λ 1 0 . . . 0
0 λ 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . λ
fiffiffiffifl
Then Jnpλq “ pλI `Nqn “ řnr“0 `nr˘λrNn´r where N is
the nilpotent matrix –
N “
»———–
0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 0
fiffiffiffifl
Then we have
Jnpλq “
»———–
λn
`
n
1
˘
λn´1
`
n
2
˘
λn´2 . . .
`
n
1
˘
λ
0 λn
`
n
1
˘
λn´1 . . .
`
n
2
˘
λ2
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . λn
fiffiffiffifl
Thus ||Jnpλq||8 “ p1`λqn´1 ùñ ||Jn||8 ě p1`λqn´1.
Then ||Jn||2 “ Ωpexp pcnqq for some c ą 0 because ||¨||8 ď?
n|| ¨ ||2. Since,
P pJq ´ pJnqTJn ľPSD 0
ùñ ||P pJnq||2 ě ||Jn||22
our claim is now proven.
E. Proof of Theorem 1
For the proof here, fix matrix A, its Gramian P pAq. Let
the SVD of P pAq “ UnDnUTn , then define as
Λ “ UnΓnUTn (11)
where ρpΓnq ď ρpAq “ γ. Set A as the –balanced version
of A. We have a very simple observation that we state here
for completeness.
Lemma 1.
ΛP pAqΛ ĺPSD γ2P pAq
Proof. Clearly,
ΛP pAqΛ “ UnDnΓ2nUTn
Then our assertion follows because Γn ĺ γI . 
We will need the following lemmas for the proof of this
theorem.
Lemma 2. For any matrices A,B we have that
ATB `BTA ĺPSD ATA`BTB
Proof. This follows from observing that
pA´BqT pA´Bq ľPSD 0

Lemma 3. For any matrices tAiuPi“1 we have that´ Pÿ
i“1
ATi
¯´ Pÿ
i“1
Ai
¯
ĺPSD P
´ Pÿ
i“1
ATi Ai
¯
Proof. By expansion we have´ Pÿ
i“1
ATi
¯´ Pÿ
i“1
Ai
¯
“
Pÿ
i“1
ATi Ai
`
Pÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
ATi Aj
“
Pÿ
i“1
ATi Ai `
ÿ
1ďiăjďP
pATi Aj `ATj Aiq
paq
ĺ P
´ Pÿ
i“1
ATi Ai
¯
Here paq follows from Lemma 2. 
Lemma 4. For A, the corresponding Gramian, P pAq and
Λ, then for any psd matrix B of the following form
B “ Λtλk . . . pAT qt2Λtλ1 pAT qt1At1Λtλ1At2 . . .Λtλk
where
řk
j“1 tλj “ tλ then
B ĺ γ2t
λ
P pAq
Proof. For any t1, t2 we have that
Λt
λ
1P pAqΛtλ1 ľPSD Λtλ1 pAt2qTAt2Λtλ1
Next observe that from Lemma 1
γ2t1P pAq ľPSD Λt1P pAqΛt1
Then we have
B “ Λtλk . . . pAT qt2Λtλ1 pAT qt1At1Λtλ1At2 . . .Λtλk
ĺPSD Λt
λ
k . . . γ2t
λ
1 pAT qt2P pAqAt2 . . .Λtλk
and the proof follows by recursively applying the inequalities.

A direct conclusion of Lemma 4 is that
σ1pBq ď γ2tλσ1pP pAqq
trpBq ď γ2tλ trpP pAqq
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we will use these observations in our proof.
In the proof we will show first how σ1pP pAqq relates to
σ1pP pAqq. For any A “ p1 ´ qA ` Λ where Λ is as in
Eq (11). Observe that, where A “ p1 ´ qA,Λ “ Λ for
shorthand,
pA ` Λqk “ Ak `Ak´1 Λ `Ak´2 ΛA ` . . .loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
pk1qarrangements
`Ak´2 Λ2 `Ak´3 Λ2A ` . . .loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
pk2qarrangements
(12)
||pA ` Λqk|| ď ||Ak || ` ||Ak´1 Λ|| ` ||Ak´2 ΛA|| ` . . .loooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
pk1qarrangements
` ||Ak´2 Λ2 || ` ||Ak´3 Λ2A|| ` . . .loooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
pk2qarrangements
(13)
ď p1´ qkaσ1pP pAqq
`
ˆ
k
1
˙
p1´ qk´1γaσ1pP pAqq
`
ˆ
k
2
˙
p1´ qk´2pγq2aσ1pP pAqq ` . . .
The last inequality follows from Lemma 4. Then, whenever
ρpΛq ď γ
σppA ` Λqkq ď
kÿ
j“0
ˆ
k
j
˙
p1´ qk´jjaσ1pP pAqqγj
ď p1´ ` γqkaσ1pP pAqq (14)
Eq. (14) directly implies that A ` Λ is stable (shown in
Lemma 5). Then P pAq exists and is uniquely given by
P pAq “
8ÿ
k“0
ppAqT qkpAqk
It follows that
σ1pP pAqq ď
8ÿ
k“0
p1´ ` γq2kσ1pP q
“ p1{p1´ p1´ ` γq2qqσ1pP q
“ Opσ1pP pAqqq
Next, we bound trpP pAqq in terms of trpP pAqq. The key
idea is to bunch together the terms that have same number
of Λ. Consider the following example,
ppA ` Λq2qT pA ` Λq2
“ ppA ` Λq2qT pA2 `AΛ ` ΛA ` Λ2q
“ pA2qTA2 ` pA2qT pAΛ ` ΛAq
` pA2qTΛ2
` pAΛ ` ΛAqTA2
` pAΛ ` ΛAqT pAΛ ` ΛAq
` pAΛ ` ΛAqTΛ2
` Λ2A2 ` Λ2pAΛ ` ΛAq ` Λ4
paq
ĺPSD 3lomon
2`1
ppA2qTA2
` pAΛ ` ΛAqTlooooooooomooooooooon
p21qarrangements
pAΛ ` ΛAq
` Λ4q
where paq follows from Lemma 2. Generalizing this ob-
servation we get
ppA ` ΛqkqT pA ` Λqk ĺPSD pk ` 1qppAT qkAk
` pAk´1 Λ ` . . .qT pAk´1 Λ `Ak´2 ΛA ` . . .qlooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
pk1qarrangements
` pAk´2 Λ2 ` . . .qT pAk´2 Λ2 `Ak´3 Λ2A ` . . .qloooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooon
pk2qarrangements
` . . .q (15)
To each of the individual summands above we will apply
Lemma 3.
pAk´1 Λ ` . . .qT pAk´1 Λ `Ak´2 ΛA ` . . .qlooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
pk1qarrangements
ĺPSD
ˆ
k
1
˙´ ÿ
pk1qarrangements
ΛpAk´1 qTAk´1 Λ ` . . .
¯
ĺPSD
ˆ
k
1
˙2
p1´ q2k´2pγq2P pAq
Here the last inequality follows again from Lemma 4. Using
a similar upper bound for each of the summand in Eq. (15)
we get
tracepppA ` ΛqkqT pA ` Λqkq
ď pk ` 1q
˜
kÿ
j“0
ˆ
k
j
˙2
p1´ q2pk´jqpγq2j
¸
tracepP q
ď pk ` 1q
˜
kÿ
j“0
ˆ
2k
2j
˙
p1´ q2pk´jqpγq2j
¸
tracepP q
ď pk ` 1qp1´ ` γq2ktracepP q
tracepP pAqq ď
8ÿ
k“0
kp1´ ` γq2ktracepP q
tracepP pAqq “ OptracepP pAqqq
The proof relies on ˆ
k
j
˙2
ď
ˆ
2k
2j
˙
This is a simple combinatorial identity which has been proved
in Proposition 8.
Finally the stability of the symmetrized network is proved
by Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. For any 0 ď  ď 1, and ρpAnq “ γ ă 1, we
have that
ρpAnq ă 1
Proof. For  ą 0, we prove this by showing that the Gramian
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series exists, i.e., Theorem 1. This follows from Eq. (14)
σppp1´ qA` Λqkq ď p1´ ` γqkaσ1pP pAqq
Then we know that for any B
lim
kÑ8 ||B
k||1{k “ ρpBq
Then we get that ρpp1 ´ qA ` Λq “ p1 ´  ` γq ă 1 for
γ ă 1. When  “ 0, A “ A which is stable by assumption.

F. Proof of Proposition 5
For a symmetric stable matrix, the Gramian P pAq “ pI ´
A2q´1. Since pI ´ Kq is symmetric then we have that for
any P “ pI ´ pI ´Kq2q´1.
P “ pI ´ pI ´Kq2q´1
“ p2K ´K2q´1
“ p1{2qK´1pI ´ p1{2qKq´1
Since K2 is positive semidefinite, and since pI´Kq is stable
we have that ρpKq ă 2 since ρpI ´Kq “ |1´ ρpKq|. Then
we have that ρpp1{2qKq ă 1 and that all eigenvalues of
I ´ p1{2qK are nonnegative and it is positive semidefinite.
Now we expand p1{2qK´1pI ´ p1{2qKq´1
p1{2qK´1pI ´ p1{2qKq´1 “ p1{2qK´1
` p1{4qI ` p1{8qK`
p1{16qK2pI ´ p1{2qKq´1
We observe that K2pI´p1{2qKq´1 is psd because if AB “
pABqT for two psd matrices A,B then AB is psd. Then
tracepp1{2qK´1pI ´ p1{2qKq´1q ě n{4` tracepp1{2qK´1
` p1{8qKq
Now our claim follows from Eq. (8), (9), (10) in [8]. Unlike
there, here we have the following constraint for stability that
0 ď ki ď 2. The second claim follows because if H2–norm
is Ωpn2q then the largest singular value has to be Ωpnq.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the following controller
K 1
2
“ ´p1{2qDLn ` p1{2qInˆn
K 1
2
is an asymmetric controller with spectral radius“ 1{2.
Then pI´Kq “ p1{2qDLn`p1{2qInˆn “ p1{2qJp1q (from
Proof of VII-D). Now for t ď n,
traceppJ tp1qqTJ tp1qq ď
tÿ
r“0
pt´ rq
ˆ
t
r
˙2
ď t
tÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
“ t
ˆ
2t
t
˙
“ C?t22t
The last equality follows from Stirling’s approximation.
Therefore for t ď n we have,
nÿ
k“0
tracepp1{22tqpJkp1qqTJkp1qq ď Cn?n
For the other case when t ą n, we have
traceppJ tp1qqTJ tp1qq ď
nÿ
k“1
n´kÿ
r“1
ˆ
t
r
˙2
a“
n´1ÿ
r“0
pn´ rq
ˆ
t
r
˙2
ď n
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
Equality a comes from applying Fubini’s theorem. We break
our analysis into t P pn, 2nq, p2n, 4nq, . . ., i.e.,
8ÿ
t“n`1
tracepp1{22tqpJ tp1qqTJ tp1qq ď
8ÿ
t“n`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
“
2nÿ
t“n`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
`
4nÿ
t“2n`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
. . .
First for t P pn, 2nq we have the following upper bound
2nÿ
t“n`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
aď C
2nÿ
t“n`1
n
22t
22t?
t
ď Cn?n
Inequality a comes from Stirling’s approximation assum-
ing n ´ 1 “ t. The key idea of the proof is to di-
vide the range p0, tq into p0, nq, pn, 2nq, p2n` 1, 4nq, p4n`
1, 8nq . . . , p2k, tq. We observe that řn´1r“0 `tr˘2 is at most
p1{2kqřtr“0 `tr˘2 because `tr˘ monotonically increases for
r ă t{2.
Now, we can generalize for t P p2kn, 2k`1nq for k ą 0,
2k`1nÿ
t“2kn`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
ď C
2k`1nÿ
t“2kn`1
n
22t
22t
2k
?
t
ď Cn
c
n
2k
Now, summing for all k “ 1, 2, . . . we get that
8ÿ
k“1
2k`1nÿ
t“2kn`1
n
22t
n´1ÿ
r“0
ˆ
t
r
˙2
ď
8ÿ
k“1
Cn
c
n
2k
tracepP pJp1qqq “ Opn?nq “ opn2q
Fig. 10: H2pI ´Kasmq variation with different –balancing
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H. Proof of Theorem 2
Observe that after a shock at time k “ 0 and with xp0q “
0. We have that xpkq “ Akω. Then
x8 “
8ÿ
k“0
1TAkω
Since ρpAq ă 1, we have that x8 “ 1T pI ´ Aq´1ω “řn
i“1 ciωi, where ci are the column sums of pI ´ Aq´1. If
cmax “ Θp1q then it is obvious that, by Large Deviation
Principle (or even a simple Chernoff Bound), would give us
´ lim
nÑ8p1{nq log pPp|x8| ą nzqq ă 8
On the other hand if cmax “ Ωpgpnqq where gpnq Ñ 8 with
n. Then it is true that
Pp|x8| ą nzq ą Ppcmaxx1 ą nzq
Pp|x8| ą nzq ą exp p´nz{cmaxq
ùñ ´ lim
nÑ8p1{nq log pPp|x8| ą nzqq ą 8
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 3, we have that
||pI ´Anq´1||1 “ Op1q ðñ ||P pAn{
a
ρpAnqq||1 “ Op1q
Proof. By the assumptions on network matrix and from Eq.
32 in Ostrowski et. al. [18] that
Rpkq
rpkq
ď γ (16)
where γ “ vmaxvmin , Av “ λPF v and for every k, where
Rpkq, rpkq are the largest and smallest row sum respectively
of Ak. Now by Assumption 3, we have that γ “ Op1q. Then
for every k we have
Rpkq
rpkq
“ Θp1q
Further observe that the matrix Ak{λkPF has Perron root 1.
Then from the Perron-Frobenius theorem for non–negative
matrices it follows that
rˆpkq ď 1 ď Rˆpkq
where Rˆpkq, rˆpkq are the largest and smallest row sum respec-
tively of Ak{λkPF and from the preceding result in Eq. 16 it
follows that any row sum of Ak{λkPF is Θp1q, i.e., does not
decay with k. Thus we have that
rˆpkq||Ak||1 ď
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
˜
AT
λPF
¸k
Ak
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
1
ď Rˆpkq||Ak||1
Since all matrices are non–negative we have that
8ÿ
k“0
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
˜
AT
λPF
¸k
Ak
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
1
“
8ÿ
k“0
Θp||Ak||1qˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 8ÿ
k“0
˜
AT?
λPF
¸k˜
A?
λPF
¸k ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
1
“ Θp||pI ´Aq´1||1q
||P pA{aλPF q||1 “ Θp||pI ´Aq´1||1q

I. Proof of Theorem 3
From Eqn. (1), we have xpkq “ Ak for all k. Then,ř8
k“0 xpkq “ pI ´ Aq´1. From Proposition 5 in [1] we
have that a large network exhibits tail risk with respect to
the standard normal distribution (or macroeconomic tail risk)
iff limnÑ8 ||v||8?n{||v||2 “ 8, where v “ 1T pI ´ Aq´1.
From Assumption 3 we have that ||pI ´ Aq´1||8 “ Θp1q.
Then this means that the sum of all elements of pI ´ Aq´1
is Θpnq (since the ratio of maximum row sum and minimum
row sum is of constant order). The condition
lim
nÑ8 ||v||8
?
n{||v||2 ă 8
implies that all column sums are of the same order (in n)
which means that ||pI ´ Anq´1||1 “ Θp1q (because sum of
column sum must equal sum of row sum). Thus
lim
nÑ8 ||v||8
?
n{||v||2 ă 8 ùñ ||pI ´Anq´1||1 “ Θp1q
The other direction is trivial, implying that
lim
nÑ8 ||v||8
?
n{||v||2 ă 8 ðñ ||pI ´Anq´1||1 “ Θp1q
J. Proof of Proposition 7
For Rn, Cn we have that piT “ p1{nq1T . Since
pimax{pimin “ 1, we have that ||pI ´ Anq´1||1 “ Θp1q for
both of these.
||piT pI ´Anq´1||8 “ ||piT ||8p1´ λPF q´1
pimin||pI ´Anq´T ||8 ď pimaxp1´ λPF q´1
For Sn we have that ||Sn||1 “ Θpnq.
K. Proof of Corollary 1
Observe that
||ATpi||8 “ λPF ||pi||8
||AT ||8pimin ď λPFpimax
||A||1 ď λPF pimax
pimin
Then
||pI ´Aq´1||1 “
8ÿ
k“0
||Ak||1
ď
8ÿ
k“0
λkPF
pimax
pimin
“ pimax
pimin
1
1´ λPF
L. Economic Model
Consider the economy consisting of n competitive sectors
denoted by t1, 2, . . . , nu, each producing a distinct product.
Each sector corresponds to a node in the network graph.
Firms in each sector employ Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nologies with constant returns to scale. Formally, for each
sector, i, we have
log pxi,t`1q “ log pΣi,tq ` log pηi,tq`
µ
˜
nÿ
j“1
aij log pyij,tq
¸
` p1´ µq log pli,tq (17)
At, each time, t, xi,t is the output of sector i, Σi,t ě 0
(since output of the network is always nonnegative) is the
total factor productivity, li,t is labor input to sector i, yij,t is
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amount of output of sector j used for the production of output
of sector i, and ηi,t ą 0 is some normalization constant.
A larger aij means that sector j is more important in the
production of output of sector i. Constant returns to scale
implies
řn
j“1 aij “ 1 for all i, where aij ě 0. From now,
An “ raijs will be referred as the economy’s input-output, or
network, matrix, where the network is denoted by N pAn;Gq,
and G is the graph induced by An. In Eq. (17), Σi,t is
a multiplicative production factor in the dynamics of the
network, where under no shock, Σi,t “ 1. We are interested
in the case when Σi,0 ă 1 and Σi,t “ 1 for all t ą 0 and
i P t1, 2, . . . , nu. This corresponds to a negative shock of the
form log pΣi,0q in the notation of Eq. (1). We further assume
that log pΣi,0q „ Ep´m2, 1q. The mathematical formulation
in (17) is completed by two resource constraints:
xi,t “
nÿ
j“1
yij,t ` ci,t
H “
tÿ
n“1
li,t ` Zt (18)
Here Zt is the total leisure, ci,t is the consumption of product
i at node i at time t, ct “ řni“1 ci,t and the sum of total
input labor and leisure is a constant. Finally, we assume that
economy maximizes the following preference function over
consumption and leisure (See Sections 2, 3 in [19]):
V0 “ maxc,Z EΣ0
« 8ÿ
s“0
upcs, Zsq
ff
upct, Ztq “ β0Zt `
nÿ
i“1
βi log pci,tq (19)
where βi ě 0 but β0 “ 0, and řnj“1 βj “ 1; βi is
i’s share in the household’s utility function. There are two
forms of heterogeneity - primitive and network (See [1]).
Intuitively, primitive heterogeneity stems from the difference
in preferences, i.e., βi, across different sectors, meanwhile
network heterogeneity is due to interconnections of input-
output matrix. Since in this work we are concerned with
topological dependence only, we will impose the following
additional assumption.
Assumption 4. The utility function has no sectoral prefer-
ences, i.e., βi “ 1{n.
Under optimal consumption and labor, i.e., optimizing V0
under the constraints Eqns. (17), (18), we have Eq. 20 of [19],
xˆt`1 “ µAnxˆt ` η ` t (20)
Here i,t “ log pΣi,tq, xˆt “ rlog px1,tq, . . . , log pxn,tqsT , and
η is some constant input to the network. Now, we assume
that the economic network is hit with a shock, t “ , at
t “ 0 (t “ 0 for all t ě 1);
Under no shock, i.e., t “ 0 for all t ě 0, we have in
Eq. (20) that
xˆnst`1 “ µAnxˆnst ` η
This gives us,
xˆt`1 ´ xˆnst`1 “ µAnpxˆt ´ xˆnst q ` t (21)
The quantity of interest here is yt “ xˆt ´ xˆnst , i.e., the
output deficit in presence of a shock. Then we have similar
to Eq. (10)
yt`1 “ µAnyt ` t
Then in the notation of Eq. (10) ωt “ t and A379 “ µAn.
Proposition 8. For any n and p ď n we haveˆ
2n
2p
˙
ě
ˆ
n
p
˙2
Proof. Consider p1`xq2n, then the coefficient of x2p is given
by ˆ
2n
2p
˙
Alternately,
p1` xq2n “ p1` xqnp1` xqn
The coefficient of xp in p1`xqn is `np˘. Since x2p can form
in many ways xpxp, xp´1xp`1. It is clear thatˆ
2n
2p
˙
ě
ˆ
n
p
˙2
where
`
n
p
˘2
by choosing xp from both p1` xqns. 
